



Australian Data Security Compromises

Size Doesn't Matter (Really!)

Presented by:

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Trustwave SpiderLabs®

Trustwave SpiderLabs uses real-world and innovative security research to improve Trustwave products, and provides unmatched expertise and intelligence to customers.

THREATS

Real-World

Discovered

Learned



Response and Investigation (R&I)
Analysis and Testing (A&T)
Research and Development (R&D)

PROTECTIONS

Customers

Products

Partners





Marketing made me do it

virtualisation
big-data
mobile
Oday
BYOD
Cloud
lulz
APT
anonymous
hacktivism
targeted

Buzzword Bingo

How many times are the following words mentioned
in the conference agenda?



Targeted Attacks

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Trustwave 2012 Global Security Report



- Results from more than **300 incident response and forensic investigations** performed in **18 countries**.
 - More than 60 IR projects in Australia and New Zealand
- Analysis from more than **2,000 manual penetration tests** and **2 million network and application vulnerability scans**.
- Review of more than **25 different anti-virus vendors**.
- Usage and weakness trends of more **then 2 million real-world passwords** from corporate information systems.

Targeted Attacks?

- Two reasons to perform an attack
 - Ideological
 - Financial gain
- Ideological = targeted attack
 - Attacker is motivated by their desire to raise awareness about a topic of interest relating to the target
 - Specific target may take longer to compromise but attacker invests time due to perceived ideological gain

Financial Gain


- Financial gain = path of least resistance
 - For many, this is a business
 - They wish to make the most they can by spending the least
 - Weakest link cliché applies
- Targets chosen on what they are, not who they are
 - Targets chosen as they have a specific vulnerability
 - Attackers invest in tooling targeting these vulnerabilities
 - These bring the marginal cost of compromise down to zero
 - Attackers job is to find as many targets as possible

Targeted vs Opportunistic


- We investigated a single targeted case last year
- The rest were opportunistic attacks
- We as a community hear about targeted attacks
 - Compulsory disclosure in USA
 - Larger targets
 - Attackers release details (ideological)
- We don't hear about opportunistic attacks

"Why would they hack me..."

- This is the first thing we hear from a victim
 - "... I'm just a ..."
 - "... I only process a few credit cards a year"
- Almost all victim businesses were less than 50 employees
- "But my IT guy said everything was safe"



Victim Assets



E-Commerce Attacks


Average Victim

- Experienced bricks and mortar retail outlet that has expanded its presence online
- Majority are less than 5,000 transactions per year
- Most make use of off the shelf shopping cart applications
 - X-Cart, Lite Commerce, osCommerce, Zen Cart, Magento, Product Cart
- Use third parties for initial setup, hosting and maintenance
- Most sites are borderline profitable


Discovery

- Attackers locate potential victims a number of ways
 - Blindly scanning for vulnerabilities
 - Often focus on a single vulnerability
 - Sometimes scan for a handful
 - User agents indicate the use of industry standard tools (e.g. Havij for SQL Injection)
 - Googling for strings that identify certain web applications
 - E.g. Pages specific to osCommerce

Entry Method



Data Harvest Method



Point of Sale Attacks




Average Victim

- Experienced bricks and mortar retail outlet
- Often in a rural location
 - Most perceive some safety from not being in "the big smoke"
- Higher volume of transactions compared to e-commerce
- Most make use of one of a handful of software applications
- Use third parties for initial setup, hosting and maintenance



Discovery

- Unsure on how attackers discover potential victims
- May be as simple as port scanning Australian IP ranges
 - Some grouping of victims by location




Entry Method

Remote Access
Application
100%



Data Harvest Method



Malware Trends

Common and targeted

Many Differences

Common

- **Self-propagation** through vulnerabilities or user actions
- **Widely distributed**
- Easily **detectable** by AV vendors

Targeted

- **No propagation** and may not exploits vulnerabilities
- Application/system specific
- Only **found in target environments**
- Most found in Trustwave 2011 investigations were **undetectable** by AV; *only 12% by top AV vendors*



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


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Targeted Malware Types

Popular Types

- **Memory Parser** obtains data in use out of system memory
- **Keystroke Loggers** target user and device input
- **Application Specific** hook the applications with access to target data



Source: Trustwave 2012 Global Security Report



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Our Defenses

Basic controls




Passwords



2.5+ Million Passwords Analyzed

- All in use within the enterprise

Common Weaknesses

- Shared 'admin' p/w
- New employee default p/w
- Poor complexity requirement
- 5% based on "password"
- 1% based on "welcome"





Victims

- Mostly non-technical
- Often relying on a third party for IT
- Rarely a recognisable brand name
- All surprised to learn that they have been compromised

Attack Methods

- Attack methods were very simple
- Remote access with weak password for Point of Sales systems
- SQL Injection / File Upload / Remote File Inclusion for ecom
- All well understood easy to protect against issues
- No 0-days, no targeted e-mails or social engineering, no covering of tracks, nothing fancy

Defence

- Stopping the majority of the attacks is simple
- Focus on the basics
 - Password security
 - Secure remote access
 - Patch management
 - Data retention
 - Application security

Action Plan

- Highly targeted attacks are certainly a concern
- In planning for these, be careful not to lose sight of the basics
- Many of the basic controls are also helpful in preventing targeted attacks
- Ensure that your service providers are well behaved

Questions?



Resources

Download the report: www.trustwave.com/GSR

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